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Re: ago24 & replies



And:
> I take your point of course, that the "head convention"
> is not the only one that is useful. I suppose that one way to go
> is to have two {xohu}s.

Aaaargh! No! I already find it hard to understand the meaning of one.
(I understand it once I've thought it in prenex form, but the idea is
that it should be immediately understood in afterthought.)

> With respect to Q-scope you & I reverse our normal positions: you
> favour simple grammar, making scope contingent on only word order
> and prenex,

Which means only word order. The prenex follows that rule too.
(But there is one exception to this simple rule: selbri modifiers
like tenses and {na} have wider scope than previous sumti quant's.)

> whereas I favour add-on devices to add flexibility
> (generally to allow for afterthought).

My normal position is not in favour of flexibility against simple
grammar. I favour flexibility where it is needed to simplify frequent
constructions. In the case of {xo'u}, I guess it does solve at least
part of the "any" issue, but I think I prefer to keep the rule of
scope following word order as much as possible. I have to look at more
examples before making up my mind whether I like {xo'u} or not.

> We argued about {nitcu} last year, and you eventually came up with a
> definition of it (which I forget) such that the x2 can coherently be
> an object.

If I remember correctly, you accepted that a definition could be based
on {vajni} (important), which accepts objects and events. Do you agree
that an irrealis event can be vajni?

> We can't sensibly discuss {nitcu} unless there is agreement
> on what it means, but in order to reply to you I'll set that problem
> aside.

Even if we can't agree on nitcu specifically. Do you think that there
is (or should be) certain tersumti that accept _exclusively_ irrealis
events?

> > A separate issue is whether {nu broda} can be an irrealis event, but I
> > suppose it has to, otherwise it will be very hard to deal with these
> > things.
>
> I find myself getting more and more confused as I try to reply to this.
> How do we verify the bridi {da nu broda}? Is it sufficient to examine
> the totality of time and see if lo nu broda ever occurred? Is occurring
> a necessary condition of nu-hood?

I now think it should be, although I see problems with both positions.

> (That is, is it the case that
> for all events there is some time such that the event occurs at that
> time?) If it is, then I don't think we can have irrealis events.

Yes we can, just like we can have irrealis objects. {lo'e mlatu} is not
a realis cat, so I would say {lo'e nu mi klama le zarci} is an irrealis
event.

> If it is not, then we can have irrealis events, but claims about
> nu broda are truth-conditionally vacuous.

Right. I think {lo nu broda} has to be realis, and for the irrealis case
I'm inclined to suggest {lo'e nu broda}.

> Supposing we therefore said all events are realis. We could get at
> the meaning approximating to an irrealis event by using {duhu da nu broda}.
> Cumbersome as that may seem, it seems the most logical position to take.
> This would mean that all irrealis sumti, e.g. x1 of cumki, should in
> fact be duhu. ({lo nu broda kei cumki} would be true iff lo nu broda
> ever occurs.}

I don't like it, but I can't really say why. They just don't seem to be
du'u places. I'll try to think of a better argument.

> So, going back to your point, {nu broda} in general is always realis.

Agreed, in the same sense that {mlatu} is always realis. But I think
that an article like {lo'e} can change this status.

> If you meant {nu broda} as a needee, then by my def. of nitcu, yes
> it must be irrealis: I suppose we shd have to say {nitcu} means
> "it is necessary for x1 (i.e. it is to x1's advantage) that x2 be
> the case", and thus say {nitcu lo duhu broda}, {nitcu lo duhu da nu
> broda}.

We already have {sarcu} for that. I think {nitcu} should be primarily
a relationship between two objects, extended to events only as long
as the relationship remains analogous to the object case.

Jorge