Re: On {lo}, and on nonexistence

[ucleaar <ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk>]

Jorge:
> > [2] {lo broda} = >0% of broda (i.e. {pisu'o ro broda}, taken individually
> >                  rather than as a mass})
> >                  [={pisu'o ro da poi broda}]
> {pisu'o ro} means the same as {piro}, because "at least all" is the same
> as "all". I don't think you can talk of percentages with quantifiers unless
> you are talking of a mass, or fractions of an individual.

How *do* you say ">0% of all broda" or "25% of all broda"?

> > But that sort of example is a bit of a red herring. Here is a more
> > relevant one, which I repeat from previous recent postings.
> >     I described a book I'd dreamt of.
> > - the book in question may not exist in this universe, but even
> > if it doesn't exist in this universe it is still posssible for
> > me to describe it in this universe.
> You could always argue that the x5 of the cukta was the stuff that
> dreams are made of. I think the problem, if any, lies in the definition
> of {cukta}.

No. It could equally well be "I described a person (that I'd dreamt of)",
or "I described a cat", or whatever.

> Is that book that you dreamed about a member of {lo'i cukta beda beide
> beidi beidaxipa}? If yes, then you can make claims about
> {lo cukta} that apply to it. If not, then those claims will be false.

It is a member of {lohi dahi cukta be da bei de bei di bei da xi pa}:
it is located in some universe, but not necessarily this one.

> Perhaps it wasn't a cukta after all, but a cukta te senva. If lo'i cukta
> does count it among its members, then there's no problem.

I think you miss the point. The answer to the question of whether it is
counted among the members, depends on whether you may consult every
universe or just this one. If you consulted only this one you wouldn't
find the one I dreamt of.

> In any case {lo cukta} would be equivalent to {da poi cukta}.

Not according to Lojbab, whose views on this question I find coherent.

> > So here is the sort of case where it matters whether a sumti is
> > +real or +/-real (not-necessarily-real).
> > In this case, I should like it to be settled whether {da poi broda}
> > means {da poi da'inai broda} (that which is a broda in this universe)
> > or {da poi da'i broda} (that which is a broda in some universe, but
> > not necessarily the one this discourse is located in). Comments by
> > pc in The Compendium indicate to me that he would be willing to
> > countenance either, as would I (for what that's worth), but I should
> > like to see the question settled.
> Unless I'm misunderstanding something, the da'i one leads to contradiction,
> unless {lo broda naku broda} can be true (so much for veridicality).

Under position [3], the one I've attributed to Lojbab,
{lo broda naku broda} can be true (and meaningful, and not a violation
of veridicality), but {da poi broda gehu na ku broda} must necessarily
be true.

Jorge to Lojbab:
> It can't be the case that:
>        lo pavyseljirna cu pavyselcirna
>        At least one unicorn is a unicorn.
> is true and at the same time:
>        no da cu pavyselcirna
>        There is nothing that is a unicorn.
> To me, these two are contradictory.

 {lo pavyseljirna cu pavyseljirna} = that which is a unicorn in some
   universe is a unicorn in this universe
 {no da cu pavyseljirna} = in this universe there is nothing that
   is a unicorn

These two are indeed contradictory.

> Therefore, if {lo pavyseljirna cu pavyselcirna} is true, then
> {da poi pavyselcirna cu pavyseljirna} is also true.

Yes. But even if {skicu lo pavyseljirna} is true, {skicu da poi
pavyseljirna} can be false. If {skicu da poi pavyseljirna} is
true, then {skicu lo pavyseljirna} is true.

> Yes, but what is a non-existent object? A unicorn is not a non-existent
> object. There is no such thing as a real life animal that has all the
> properties ascribed to unicorns, but the unicorn as a mythological
> character exists as a mythological character.

In this universe, no unicorn exists. In other universes, unicorns
exist. So long as we know whether we're talking about this universe
or not (where "this universe" can in fact be a fictional one, if
the discourse is fictional) then there's no problem.

> > |But the status quo remains, as far as I know, that "lo [unicorn] cu
> > |brode" is not the same as da poi [unicorn] cu broda.
> And what is the difference? Is {lo pavyselcirna cu pavyseljirna} true?
> Is {noda pavyseljirna} true?

I think {lo pavyseljirna cu pavseljirna} uttered in a context where the
local universe is the real one, is false, and in the same context
{noda pavyseljirna} is true.

The difference is:
  {lo pavyseljirna cu brode} = {dahinai lo dahi pavyseljirna cu brode}
   = {dahinai da poi dahi pavyseljirna cu brode}
  {da poi pavyseljirna cu brode} = {dahinai da poi dahinai pavyseljirna
     cu broda} = {dahinai lo dahinai pavyseljirna cu broda}

> The problem is not with {lo} or {da poi}, the problem is how
> you define the selbri {pavyseljirna}. Once we are clear on that, then
> it becomes clear that {lo pavyseljirna} and {da poi pavyseljirna} refer
> to the same thing, just like {lo gerku} and {da poi gerku} refer to
> the same thing. Whether the thing they refer to is a real life beast
> or a mythological character depends on the definition of {pavyseljirna}.

No. For each predication, we must know whether it holds in this
universe or a possibly imaginary one. The default is normally that
it holds in this universe, but in the case of {lo} it holds in a
possibly imaginary one.

> > I personally would like to be able to assume that someone using "da" (at
> > least unmarked by a discursive) IS making a claim of real existance.
> And what do you mean by real existance? Do numbers have real existence?
> Do you mean that they can be touched, or that they can be conceived
> (by the mind, of course)?

Real existence means they can be located in this world. It's clearer
to see with concrete things, like rock. If something is a rock in
this world then it can be kicked in this world - that's how you test
its existence. If something is a rock in some world other than this
one, then it cannot be kicked in this world, although it can be
described or dreamt of in this world, and it can be kicked in that world
where it is a rock.

Chris:
> >Lojbab:
> >> I take this as meaning that invoking "lo [unicorn]"
> >> alters the universe of discourse - not that it makes statements about
> >> "reality" (whatever that is).
> >The source of my unhappiness is that it is not true that the very fact
> >of talking about a unicorn shifts us into a universe of discourse where
> >unicorns exist. "I drew a picture of a unicorn" doesn't. That can be
> >true in the 100% real kickable world in which no unicorn exists.
> I drew a picture of a unicorn [which I saw yesterday on the way to work]
>        mi finti le pixra be le pavseljirna

{le}, being +specific, -veridical, confuses matters. Stick with
{lo pavyseljirna}.

> I drew a picture of a unicorn [some variant of the "typical" unicorn]
>        mi finti le pixra be le'e pavseljirna

I've no idea what {lehe} means. But at any rate it is perfectly
sensical to say "I drew a picture of a hornless, striped unicorn",
so typicality is not an issue.

> The first is transparent, and does indeed shift us into a
> different universe of discourse;

    {Mi finti le pixra be lo pavseljirna} is true. [I've just
      gone and drawn it, to make absolutely sure!]
    {Mi finti le pixra be lo vlagi be mi} is true.
    {lo vlagi cu pagbi mi} is false.

> >That said, John's point is usually valid, in the sense that for
> >"A unicorn approached me" to be potentially true, we have to
> >shift to a universe where unicorns exist.
> su'a You're saying that John's point is valid in transparent
> references, but not in opaque ones, xunai?

There are certain predications that can be true in this world
even if the sumti don't exist in this world. "Draw a picture of"
is such a predicate. There are other predicates, such as "approach",
that can be true in this world only if their sumti exist in this
world. Thus if {A unicorn approached me} or {lo pavyseljirna cu klama
mi} are uttered as ostensibly true, then I the hearer shall presume
that we have turned our local universe into a fictional one.

> Whatever the answer is here, I'm sure it ties back into the
> transparent/opaque question, and we can't solve one without
> solving the other.

I'm inclined to think it doesn't tie back into the opacity discussion,
though I'm sure opacity will tangle up back into this discussion.
The opacity problem has been solved to my satisfaction (opaque
references must occur quantified within a subordinate bridi), but I
realize that not everyone feels this way.

---
And