Re: On {lo} and existence

[ucleaar <ucleaar@ucl.ac.uk>]

Jorge:
> > We must also bring into consideration the world that determines the
> > truth of a proposition. If you say S.H. is a man, and you say it of
> > this world, then it's false. If you say it of the fictional world
> > then it's true. Either way, you and your utterance remain in this
> > world.
> Are you saying that I can utter {la cerlok xolmyz cu nanmu}, and this
> will be either true or false depending on my intentions?

Sort of. I'm saying essentially that true/false is a 2 (or 3) place
predicate:
  proposition x1 is true of world x2 (to degree x3)

Sentences express propositions. If we evaluate the truth of the
proposition we must choose our x2. In practise, a hearer would
assume the x2 intended by the speaker, but as far as the sentence
or utterance is concerned, the x2 is unspecified.

> I have no problem with that, as long as you agree that {da poi nanmu
> du la cerlok xolmyz} has the same truth value in the same circumstances.

I'm willing to go along with that.

> > I mean "A.R. mentioned S.H." to be a proposition rather than an
> > utterance. As you know, I do not believe utterances have truth-values.
> > Utterances are actions, like sneezing or kicking a football are.
> > This *proposition* is true as it applies to this world, and false
> > as it applies to the fictional world.
> Let's see if I understand the definitions:
> A sentence is a string of words.

Yes, but in more than merely sequential relationships with each other.
I.e. not merely a string of words.

> An utterance is an act of using a sentence.

Yes.

> What is a proposition? Is it derived from a sentence or from an
> utterance?

>From an utterance. Because of things like deictics and +specific
references, many sentences will not yield complete propositions.

But note that the proposition derived by grammatical rules (augmented
by reference assignment) from an utterance is not necessarily the only
proposition communicated. This is especially obvious with irony.

> If, on the other hand, it is derived from an utterance, the context is
> already determined, and then its truth value is also determined. Then
> there is no crime in saying that an utterance has a truth value, it is
> well defined, it's the truth value of the proposition associated with it.

First, even if we have determined the context, and can therefore
establish the x3 of true(proposition3234,world2,?), the resulting
truth value doesn't inhere to proposition3234.

Second, the context is not determined. The comprehender recursively
expands the context until a relevant interpretation of the utterance
is found. Thus, whoever interprets an utterance chooses their own
context. Two people hearing the same utterance may choose different
contexts.

> > I take "imaginary" and "not of this universe" to be the same.
> This is the root of our disagreement then. In that case, I agree you
> can talk about things "not of this universe". But the quantifiers
> quantify over these without any difficulty. There's no need for
> any special marking at the level of quantification. The distinction,
> if needed, is made by a predicate, {xanri} or some such.

Fine. This is what I've been advocating.

    {nu} without explicit {dahinai} is associated with implicit {dahi}.
    All other predicates without explicit {dahi} have implicit {dahinai}

{dahinai} = real. {dahi} = real or imaginary. "Real" means "real in the
universe of discourse". "Imaginary" means "not real in the universe of
discourse".

---
And