Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:
>>>    i thought Yahoo press releases were considered defacto truth....
>
>        i mi krici le du'u jinvi le du'u lo nuzba befi le la ia'us kagni
>        ke sevzi nuzba cu se jetnu/ve djuno
>
>would seem better to me, though I think that krici there is really jinvi
>and jinvi wher you had it is legitimately djuno.

Hmm...  "To consider" does not have presupposition of truth. I could say:
"Yahoo press releases are considered defacto truth, but they are not."
But I can't say: "Yahoo press releases are known defacto truth, but they
are not." So I would keep {jinvi} for "consider".

As for {krici} vs {jinvi} for "I thought", either works for me. I used
{krici}
because I was already using {jinvi} in the same sentence, and besides
there did not appear to be much justification for the belief.

 >Let us say that the particular news item indeed DOES convey truth (as
>widely recognized).

But we won't disagree in this case. What do you mean by truth "as widely
recognized"? Do you mean fatci?

> For some people it is truth because they got it from
>Yahoo press releases.  Others, more skeptical of complany self-promotion,
>would not consider that a valid epistemology (r metaphysical basis), but
would
>require some other type or level of evidence.  Thus A djuno F fo la ia'us.
>and B djuno F fo le drata, but B na djuno F fo la ia'us. because B does not
>accept the epsitemological source as valid.

That's fine. I agree that people can come to know things from
different sources. As long as it is a truth (as widely recognized)
then some people may know it from having read it in the press
release, others may know it from someone else having told them,
others might know it from different sources. As long as we
are all in agreement that there is a widely recognized truth to be
known. Our difference of opinion comes when there is no such
widely recognized truth. Let's say Yahoo by mistake releases
some report F that is obviously false to everyone as widely
recognized. Would you still claim that A djuno F fo la ia'us? You
certainly would not say in English that A knows F from having
heard  it from Yahoo.

>Clearly here, to A, F jetnu la ia'us is a true proposition, while to B it
is
>a false proposition.

That's what strikes me as odd. You're saying that "F jetnu la ia'us"
has no widely recognized truth value. A will claim it is true, B will
say no it isn't, and there's no way they can reach an agreement?
Is jetnu just a matter of preference? This is not what normally
happens with other predicates. Good thing we have fatci then.
For example, I might claim:

(1)                i ta blanu
                     That is blue.

(2)                i di'u fatci
                    That's a fact.

Now, how do we know whether (1) is true or not? Well, in most
cases people agree what things count as blue, so if {ta} is a more
or less central example of blueness there won't be disagreement.
And by the same metaphysics as (1) is widely recognized as true,
(2) will be widely recognized as true as well. The differences of
opinion will be the same ones that occur about (1). Or are you
saying that we could have (1) being true and (2) being false by
the same metaphysics? On the other hand, using jetnu would
complicate matters a bit more. We could say:

(3)                i di'u jetnu <by wide recognition>

which would be equivalent to the simpler claim (2).  Saying just:

(4)                i di'u jetnu

will also work, because the understood metaphysics would be
the same as that implicit in (1) and (2), wouldn't it? But there will
be more room left for doubt as to what is meant.

co'o mi'e xorxes