more epistemic perversity (was Re: .i .uepei mi jai selke'u

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

Lojbab:
> >So
> >why should Lojban not presume universal agreement on what is
> >knowable/true?
>
> Well, for one thing because we have strong evidence that truth is subjective
> as is knowledge, with significant differences among and even within cultures
> as to"truth" regarding such thinsg as religion, politics, and human emotions.
> Different epistemological methods give different sets of knowables, and some
> epistemological methods will give a different answer to different people using
> the same method (e.g. dreams).

(i) Is there a list of which gismu places are presumed to be subject
to consensus and which are presumed to be subject to intersubjective
disagreement?

(ii) Your position seems to lead to strange results. For example, the
truth of {ti mlatu} is presumed to be determinable against some
consensual metaphysics, but the truth of {"true" fa le du`u ti mlatu}
is presumed to not be determinable consensually. It seems utterly
nonsensical to me.

> Because I recognized that subjectivity and multiple and contradictory
> epistemologies exist, I included the x2 on jetnu and the x4 on djuno.
> Since they are there, Lojban does NOT presume universal truth on a given
> se djuno, and not on a jetnu without specifying its se jetnu.
>
> Maybe it is perverse, but it seemed metaphysically necessary.

You have made a mistake in your reasoning. As I have previously pointed out,
the existence of x4 on djuno does not entail that Lojban does not presume
universal truth on a given se djuno. They are logically independent of each
other.

So I accept that to you it has hitherto seemed metaphysically
necessary, but you have been deluded.

--And