Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

>>As ~mark pointed out some time back this thread, you seem to
>>be confusing assertions with truth. Your mental state is relevant to your
>>asserting that I am red. Your asserting that I am red does not make
>>me red, even if you believe it is true.
>
>Not necessarily true.

I don't understand what you mean. Which part is not necessarily true?

>BUT, if I am accurately reporting, then it may be
>red according to my metaphysics even if it is blue according to yours.

Maybe. I'm not sure what you mean. I don't see how this relates
to our discussion either. If you say that something is red, but what
you undersand as "red" is different from what I understand, what
are you communicating? You'd be just making some noise as far
as I could tell.

>The universe of discourse, as it seems to have evolved, may or may not be
>the "real world".  Therefore, unless we explicitly AGREE on some external
>standard of truth and of redness, there is always some risk that we are
>indeed NOT talking about the same "world".

There is always the risk, but so what? I'm lost. What's your point?
We can agree explicitly or implicitly on a standard of redness as
well as on a standard of fatciness.

>>If you don't suppose
>>that your idea of a mlatu is more or less the same as mine, what do
>>you expect me to understand when you say {ta mlatu}?
>
>Ah, but that is itself a presupposition!. I agree that we have to assume
>that our truths are more or less synchronous, but that does not mean that
>they really are, nor does it mean that ALL of them are.

?!?

> Clearly you and I for
>example have different ideas about what it means to know something.  Yet we
>still manage to communicate.

Barely.

 >The concept you have for "know" requires that the speaker presume the
truth of
>the knowledge (as opposed to the x1 so presuming), and hence would have to
>be worded to make this clear.

Not really. What you are calling "my" concept is not particularly
mine. I'm quite happy with the current wording:

x1 knows fact(s) x2 (du'u) about subject x3 by epistemology x4

It is you who says that it really means "is convinced". I'm pretty sure
that the current wording will indicate to others the same meaning
that I understand.

>But I will not argue this one further since I still am not sure that I know
>what your definition of "know" really is, and have agreed not to argue it
>further.

That's up to you of course. I suppose you don't have an answer then
for what is it that makes some sentences  change meaning so
drastically when you replace "is convinced" with "knows". Other than
presupposition of truth.

>>>If there is ANY debate as to the truth
>>>of a proposition possible, under any epistemology or metaphysics, then
>>>it is not a fatci.
>>
>>Isn't that a bit strong?
>
>The gismu list says truth "in the absolute".

Right. But "absolute" is a word like any other word. It needs a metaphysics
under which to operate, just like {mlatu}, {blanu}, {klama}, etc. (list of
all
gismu here).

>That is indeed most extreme.
>General semanticists that deny the mathematical axiom of identity will not
>necessarily agree that "x=x" is a fatci (There is a guy who has been an
>active Lojbanist at one time who is such a G.S. afifcionado - I am not
saying
>that all G.S. people are so extreme).

Well, it's their prerogative to disagree, of course.

[BTW, I notice that you are even using the word {fatci} in your English
discourse. Surely it can't be so useless if you find it of use even when
speaking a language other than Lojban!]

>>Is that claim of yours a fatci? If I say:
>>
>>        le du'u la lojbab cu rirni re da cu fatci
>>        "That lojbab has two children is a fact."
>>
>>are you going to categorically assert that that claim is false?
>>Under any and every metaphysics? Seems to me like you can't have
>>it both ways.
>
>No I merely have to assume that there MAY exist a metaphysics under which
it
>is false.  And I am sure that there is.  If it is true under the default
metaics,
>but false under some plausible metaphysics (wjere plausible is in the
>eye of the beholder), then it is not truth in the absolute

I think you missed my point. I am not talking of the claim {la lojbab cu
rirni re da }. I am talking of the full claim {le du'u la lojbab cu rirni re
da
cu fatci}. You seem to be saying that that last claim has to be false
no matter what. "In the absolute."

>Note that the positions I am arguing are those of the extreme postmodernist
>insofar as I understand them.  But Lojban needs to be speakable by extreme
>postmodernists as well as by rationalists, ande therefore hidden
assumptions
>should be made explicit as much as is possible.

You seem to be under the misimpression that the presupposition of truth
of the x2 of djuno is somehow a hidden assumption. It is not. It is as overt
as it can be.

co'o mi'e xorxes