Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>>A presumption requires a presumer, and whose presumption matters- the
>>speaker's, the listener's, or le djuno.  I contend that only le djuno's
>>presumption can be relevant since the speaker is not always knowlable, and
>>likewise the lset of listeners, and it seems unacceptable that truth of
>>a proposition be NECESSARILY based in such a way.
>
>But the beliefs of the speaker do NOT enter into the evaluation of truth
>of the proposition. The beliefs of the speaker may be relevant to judge
>the honesty of the assertion, but not its truth.

You seem to be contradictiong your earlier statements, which I remember as
being that the presumption of the speaker is critical to the truth of a
djuno statement.

NOW it seems that you are saying that the critical factor is some absolute
truth of the proposition, independent of speaker, listener, and presumed
knower.  But all this can lead to is that we can never use djuno for anything
for which truth is not absolute.  We can never say that
Alice knows that John loves her, because the truth of that statement will
will never be known to Alice, and may not even be known to John (he may
believe that he loves her, but his beehavior and subconscious thoughts,
may demonstrate otherwise, and indeed hios definition of love may
differ from Alice's).  We can never say that someone knows that there
are 9 planets, because the truth of this depends on the definition of
planet, and may be falsified by new information that has already been disocvered
but not yet been publicized.  But we don't explicitly or implicitly put
all these caveats in staements about knowledge when we make them.  And we
don't consider all of them when we evaluate their truth.  At most we cabn
say that connotations of truth arise from statements about knowledge.  I think
that the staement and the connoatations need to be separated in Lojban.

>(1) Alice doesn't love John, but Peter knows that she does.
>(2) Alice doesn't love John, but Peter is convinced that she does.
>
>Why is (1) still odd and (2) still ok?

tackling this, it seesm that the English works the way it does because the
knowledge/convincing clause is subordinate to a statement of (presumed) truth.

Peter knows that Alice loves John, but she doesn't (really) sounds odd
but is plausible as a suggestion that they hold different definitions of
love.

I will agree that your examples show flaws with "is convinced" in that it is
ambiguous between the definitions I intended for birti and djuno.  We seem
to normally take "is convinced" to mean some kind of dogged certainty that
may exist despite the facts, which is what I think birti means.  Whereas
I meant by
"is convinced" that sense associated with "justified", where the jsutification
is an epistemology rather than necessarily some tangible or arguable evidence.

>>Huh, I was using it as an example to show that "'x=x' cu fatci" is not
>>valid because there are metaphysical principles that deny it.
>
>You are using the word, therefore it is not useless. Even if you
>use it just to express your view that nothing is an absolute fact,
>you have found a use for it

Of course.  That is indeed its only use for me - to deny its exisitence.

>> Indeed, what seems to
>>be the case is that the truth of
>>la djan cu djuno da
>>(leka jetnu) has become based on something not in the place structure of
>>jetnu, in particular the speaker or listener or whoever you feel needs to
>>be the presumer of les se djuno in order for
>>le du'u la djan cu djuno da cu jetnu
>>to be valid.
>--More--
>
>I can't follow that paragraph, I think something was cut off.

No, but I agree it is hard to parse.  I think I have restated it better in
other postings.

lojbab