Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>But is this actually defining for {jetnu}, or is it like your use of
>"know" in the definition for {djuno} - nondefining, and misleading
>due to your pardonable and relative lack of competence when writing
>the documentation?

Probably %^)

>> >2. Why does {jetnu} have a standard-or-metaphysics place and {mlatu}
>> >not? It seems to me (at least at the moment, but mi jinvi gi`e na
>> >birti) that {mlatu} has an equally good claim to such a place.
>...
>
>But how about an answer to my question, which has also independently
>been posed by Jorge a number of times?

Because truth and metaphysics are definitionally recognized to be intertwined.
Because "what is truth?" seems to be the ultimate metaphysical question.
"What is a cat?" is not.

We categorize the things in the world such that some of them are cats.
Metaphysics doesn't determine which properties are associated with cathood;
that set of properties is part of the definition of "cat".

The same would apply to truth except that  the very existence of multiple
metaphysics means that we do not necessarily agree what properties apply, as
those properties are in fact associated with different metaphysics'.

An alternate way of looking at it (haven't analyzed it out) is that there are
many species of truth, just as there are many species of cat.  The metaphysics
place for truth works as the species place for cat, except that a given truth
could hold for a variety of different metaphysics, whereas for the most part
a given cat is only a member of one species/breed.

If a cat is a mlatu under any one species, it is lo mlatu.
If a tryth is true under at least one metaphysics, it is lo jetnu.

There are some who consider that a truth under one particular metaphysics is
not necessarily a truth under another  It sounds like you would answer me
that if something is a cat under one particular metaphysics it might not be a
cat under some other.  But 1) we DEFINE cathood such that if a metaphysics
recognizes all elements of that definition, then it recognizes cathood by
virtue of it meeting that definition. 2) in actual language use, we do not
consider metaphysics in talking about cats, whereas we do in talking about
truths.

>I am arguing that if {djuno} is to be usefully distinct from other
>{gismu}, then, in the current absence of alternative distinctions [an
>absence which I hope to rectify in a later message], a useful
>distinction is for x2 of {djuno} to be true.

It has to be true for the x1.  There are things that I beleive/krici, but which
I also have some degree of doubt.  There are things that I opine, but I also
 harbor some doubt.  But given a particular epistemology, I should not have
 doubt
regarding something i djuno.  On the other hand, djuno is distinguished from
 birti in that I can be birti of something without being able to justify it,
or epistemologize it.  I can also djuno something without being birti of it,
if I have one epistemology which without doubt "proves" the x2, whereas another
epistemology supports doubt.

>I am NOT arguing that {djuno} MUST be defined in such a way that its
>x2 is true. Just that, other things being equal, {djuno} SHOULD be so
>defined.

No - I am saying that my concept of truth recognizes that there are many
flavors of truth, and I cannot see how to usefully apply "truth" as a
standard to le se djuno without indicating what kind of truth one is
referring to.

>You, though, seem to be arguing that the true-x2 version of {djuno}
>is somehow inherently flawed, and I strongly contest that. If you did
>turn out to be correct then your argument would pertain not to
>{djuno} in particular but to the entire vocabulary.

It is inherently flawed in that it talks about the truth of one place without
bringing in the metaphysics associated with said truth.  "mlatu" does not talk
about the "truth" of x1.  The animal sleeping on the chair next to me is not
a "truth". (That he is sleeeping next to me, is a truth).

>
>At any rate, as I've said elsewhere, I don't see why x2's being true
>requires a metaphysics place while x2's being, say, feline doesn't.

because I don't know what you mean by claiming it is "true" unless you
convey ytour metaphysics to me (I would usually assume some metaphysics
similar to mine, probably incorrectly given the nature of our typical
discussion %^).  The definition of what is true is a metaphysics.

To know what you mean by "x1 is a mlatu", I need to knwo what your
definition of "mlatu" is.  But we don't call varying definitions of mlatu
different metaphysics.  We do call varying definitions of truth different
metaphysics.

>So, to repeat, I deny that there is anything intrinsically
>problematic with the true-x2 version of {djuno}.

It is lacking the metaphysics place.  It therefore makes as much sense to me
as zi'o klama (without the x1).

>> >So what we disagree on is on whether
>> >
>> >    ko`a jetyju`o ko`e   [where jetyju`o = true-x2 version of djuno]
>> >
>> >has a truth-value that is as independent of the speaker as {ta
>> >mlatu}.
>>
>> I certainly have no problem with there being a jetyju'o limited only to
>> x2 beuing true.  I also agree that in most cases, djuno would suffice
>
>Good. So if it works for {jetyju`o} then it could work for {djuno}.

jetyju'o, I am presuming, would have a metaphysics place.  Then it would
work.

>{djuno} doesn't even specify the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2
>to be true.

Right, it need only be some metaphysics that is compatible with his
epistemology (in his estimation).  No other person is mentioned in the bridi,
so there is no basis to being in anyone else's judgement of teh unmentioned
metaphysics.
>Anyway, I would be content to define the true-x2 version of {djuno} as "...
>and x2 is true by the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2 to
>be true". That would side-step the problem you raise.

I think so, and indeed that it says what I just said.  But we don't know what
that metaphysics is - it is not stated nor implied.  In any event the
person who is judging truth is the x1, and not the speaker.  Thus George can
djuno something by an epistemology whioch I reject as invalid, and thereby
know something that I consider to be false.  My own opinions on epistemology
and metaphsyics are not relevant when reporting on George's knowledge, which is
rpeorting on his internal state as evaluated by him.  (recognizing that
such evaluation may be subconscious, thus allowing us to say that we
observe that "George knows x2, but he denies it" based on observing
knolwedge-revealing behavior.

>> Going back to this, I think that djuno requires a metaphysics by which x1
>> could conclude that x2 is true.
>
>Could *correctly* conclude that x2 is true?

Correct by whose standards.  x1's standards are the only ones that count.

I don't understand "correct" any more than I understand "true" in the
absence of some universal standard of correctness and/or truthin this
context.  And none has been stated.

lojbab