Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>]

>So in your opinion, it would not make sense to have place structures like:
>--More--
>"x1 asserts that x2 is true in metaphysics x3"

mi na jinvi di'u

We have a proposition x2.

I can assert x2, which MEANS that I am saying it is true.  It is the
essence of assertion/xusra that it claims truth.  there is no metaphysics
involved here - it is the definition of "assert".

To assert that x2 is true under metaphysics x3 is a partilcular kind of
assertion (at least as I understand the English.  You are saying that x2 is
true under a particular metaphysics, perhaps as distinguished from some
other metaphysics.  You actually could express your 3-placer as
x1 asserts le du'u x2 jetnu x3
as an exact equivalent.  The metaphysics is tied only to the x2's truth and
has nothing to do with the act of asserting itself.

I can assert something you and I might consider false, but I am still asserting
 it AS true.

xusra is more akin to cusku than it is to any discussion of truth.

>"x1 thinks that x2 is true
>of x3
>in metaphysics x5 based on grounds x4"

Again, I don't agree.  I can opine something as being true regardless of
the metaphysics (or in spite of the metaphysics).  Netaphysics determines
whether it really IS truth and not necessarily  how I think about truth
(
indeed most people do not consider metaphysics at all when contemplating
what is true and what is not).

On the other hand, I can form an  opinion as to whether x2 would be true under
a particular metaphysics which I may or may not consider a valid metaphysics.
THis is the sense I get out of your place structure - again it is
equivalent to
x1 jinvi ledu'u x2 jetnu x5 kei about x3 on grounds x4
The metaphysics has nothing to do with the act of opining.

This then correlates back to true-djuno which I understand as being
x1 djuno le du'u x2 jetnu metaphysics x5 kei about x3 under epistemology x4

>According to you, the metaphysics places there are redundant because
>the one and only possible metaphysics to fill them is already a part of
>the selbri?

Thta would only be true if the metaphysics was that which determines the truth
of the relationship xusra or jinvi (or mlatu), which could be totally
independent of the metaphysics involved in the truth of the assertion
or the opinion.

>And yet it is perfectly possible to assert or opine that
>something
>is true in one metaphysics and false in another, isn't it? How do you
>reconcile those two positions?

I can also assert that something is truth-in-the-absolute (i.e. fact).
Or I can assert something is true under metaphysics m1, but whether the is
assertion is true or not might me evluated using metaphysics m2.

>>kanxe, and other words pertaining to logical operations are presumed to
>>have be associated with logical epistemologies/metaphysics.
>
>Really? So you cannot say something like:
>
>        le du'u la cev cu vrude gi'e cimni cu kanxe
>        le du'u la cev cu vrude kei le du'u la cev cu cimni
>        "God is good and infinite" is a conjunction stating that
>        both "God is good" and "God is infinite" are true.
>
>Are the claims there associated with logical epistemologies/metaphysics?
>--More--
>Or is that an improper use of {kanxe}?

It is the nature of le ka kanxe that x1 is a conjunction of x2 and x3, and
that nature is totally independent of whether or not x2 and x3 are really true
or whether x1 is true for that matter.  A logician might say that kanxe should
 have been defined as
x1 is a conjunction composed of x2 and x3 which is true if x2 and x3 are
both true
or something like that.  But lay people might not understand and get confused
by a repetition of x2 and x3.  Again, kanxe is about conjunction, and not
about truth.

>Then we agree. When you say {ko'a djuno ko'e} you are making
>(among others) assertion ko'e without any consideration of the
>metaphysics involved.

"I" am making no such assertion, because djuno is not about MY consideration
of truth; it is only about x1's concept of truth and x1's use of
epistemology x4. *I* am not asserting x2; I am asserting something about
the relationship between x2 and x1, x3, and x4.  That which I am asserting is
NOT that x2 is "true", but that x2 is "known as true".  Like4wise,
if I talk about what George asserts using xusra, I am talking not about
what is true, but about what is *asserted as true*.

Surely I can say that
la djef cu xusra le du'u mi patfu voda
Jeff asserts that I am the father of 4.
which I know to be a falsehood.

Whether he asserts it has nothing to do with metaphysics, and the fact that
he asserts probably does not lead me to be concerned about what metaphysics
he might be operating under.  If I was concerned, we could create a lujvo to
talk about said metaphysics, but that would be something different.  Likewise
to talk about the truth value of a bit of knowledge might involve bringing
in metaphysics, but then we are talking about truth and not about the
knower/knowledge relationship.

>>It still remains an assertion.  Whether that
>>assertion is ACTUALLY true may depend on the metaphysics.
>--More--
>
>Right. Exactly the same thing applies to {djuno} as I understand it.


That is not what I have understood you to say.

If indeed he made such an assertion, then it is valid to say
la djef cu xusra le du'u mi patfu voda
Jeff asserts that I am the father of 4.
whether or not the x2 is true (to me).
Likewise
la djef cu djuno le du'u mi patfu voda
Jeff knows that I am the father of 4.
Whether the djuno proposition is true or not does not depend on the truth
of the x2 proposition (to me who states the bridi)

lojbab