Re: Truth-ambiguous djuno [was Re: Summary so far on DJUNO]

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

cu'u la rik
>In the sense that we can say that we can have an epistemology by which
>we derive knowledge, but who can say if that epistemology would be in
>complete accordance with the Real World?

How can we say that we can have an epistemology by which
we derive knowledge? Can we say it with any certainty?
With greater certainty than we can say that a given epistemology
is in accordance with the real world? How could you be sure
that the derivation of knowledge was real?

 >>Right. That does not mean that no epistemology is valid.
>
>But by what means do you determine which epistemologies are valid?

It doesn't matter, different people might use different means.
I consider direct observation a pretty valid epistemology most
of the time, even if not infallible. If I see a cat, I am willing to make
the claim "that's a cat". I'm also willing to claim "it is true that
that's a cat", or even "I know that that's a cat based on my observation".


> One could believe some subset of the statements
>generated by an epistemology and not others, and still
>cover this with a truth-ambiguous djuno.

Yes, and also with a true-x2 djuno.

 >I was just saying that the requirment to assert that x2 is true
>independently of the epistemology x4 makes it nearly impossible to use
>djuno given the difficulty of determining what is "true" outside of an
>epistemology.  What does it mean for "the derivative of e^x is e^x" to
>be true outside of mathematics?

Are you saying that you cannot determine the truth of a statement like:

 (1)               e^x is the derivative of e^x.

Because you can make that statement in Lojban as well as in
English. If you cannot determine the truth of that, then I wouldn't
worry about determining the truth of a much more complex claim
like:

 (2)               John knows that e^x is the derivative of e^x
                     from mathematical reasoning.

If you don't believe (1) is true, why should you care whether
(2) is true?

 >It was intended to be an examination of what would result if all
>assertion or belief of the truth of the x2 or the validity of x4 in
>producing truthful statements was dropped from djuno.

All right, I misunderstood then. I thought you were claiming that
true-x2 djuno was demonstrably unusable.

>Also, there seemed to be an abundance of gismu for varying stages of the
>belief in the truth of a statement, but only djuno as a way to refer to
>statements generated by an external epistemology, so it seemed possibly
>instructive to separate truth from djuno.

But wouldn't a place structure like "x1 is an epistemology that generates
x2"
make more sense for that? What role does the knower play in your version
if they don't even believe the x2 nor trust the validity of x4?

>If djuno simply meant "x1 knows x2 is true
>of x3 under epistemology x4,"

But that's exactly what it means!

>then it would be simple to add belief to
>that or not,

What remains if you remove belief from that?

x1 knows from epistemology x4 that x2 is true of x3
but x1 does not necessarily believe that x2 is true of x3.

>but trying to express that I have indirect knowledge
>through some epistemology without committing myself to its truth is
>tricky with a true-x2 required djuno.

Could you give an example of some indirect knowledge that
you have through some epistemology and whose truth
you are not commited to? Then I might try to say it in Lojban,
but I don't really understand what you mean.

co'o mi'e xorxes