Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

["Mark E. Shoulson" <shoulson@CS.COLUMBIA.EDU>]

>Date:         Tue, 27 Jan 1998 01:19:00 -0500
>From: Logical Language Group <lojbab@ACCESS.DIGEX.NET>
>
>>Hmm...  "To consider" does not have presupposition of truth. I could say:
>>"Yahoo press releases are considered defacto truth, but they are not."
>>But I can't say: "Yahoo press releases are known defacto truth, but they
>>are not." So I would keep {jinvi} for "consider".
>
>
>I think that this example says more about the use of the word "truth"
>than the word "know": in the absence of  specifically contradictory information
>we presume that "truth" is a universal truth in English, whereas there are
>(rather more rare) meanings of English "truth" that allow for relative truth.
>The USAn Dewclaration of Independence"  We hold these truths to be self-evident
>that all men are created equal, and that each is endowed with certain
>inalienable rights, and that among these rights are life, liberty and the
>pursuit of happiness."
>
>Now clearly there are some societies and cultures tthat do not recognize
>those statements as "true", so are they "truths"?  Can it be said that
>USAns don't really "know" these to be true, but merely "opine" them or
>"believe" them simply be4cause someone else choses NOT to accept them as truth?

I really shouldn't be butting into the discussion again; it's gotten beyond
me, but near as I can tell there's one thing that's really causing a lot of
trouble with understanding the Llambian POV on "djuno."

All this business about "if someone knows something, it must be true" "but
there are people who don't believe it" or "but how can they be SURE beyond
ALL doubt?  Maybe it's NOT true, does that make their knowledge false?"
It's all missing a significant point.

As I see it, Jorge/And/etc (and I think me) are saying that when I say that
X knows proposition Y, I am saying that X believes Y, and I am *ASSERTING*
that X is true (and incidentally that I believe it as well).  I might be
wrong, there might be other people who think I'm wrong, but while the
truth/falsity of the proposition affects the truth-value of the djuno
statement (which is a significant point in itself), it doesn't affect its
applicability.  Maybe I can't be totally sure, maybe I'll be wrong, but I'm
allowed to be wrong.  Using {djuno} doesn't make something true, nor am I
forbidden from saying it about something turns out to be false (it just
makes me wrong).  If I were never allowed to say anything that isn't
completely true, I'd really be in trouble!

So just remember that's it's an *assertion* that something is true that
we're dealing with.  I may sound really stupid saying what you all already
knew, but for whatever reason when reading this thread it seemed to me that
there was some trouble remembering it.

~mark