Re: more epistemic perversity

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

Lojbab:
>The particle "really" is part of what makes the English sentence seem odd
>(becuase it implies that one "knowledge" is not "real-world"; but I agree
that
>even without really, it sounds a little odd because we "hear" the 'really'
>even when it is not spoken.

But you're not answering the question! What you say applies equally to
either of the following sentences:

(1) I have two children, but John knows that I really have only one.

(2) I have two children, but John is absolutely convinced that I really
      have only one.

Yet (2) is perfectly acceptable. So your explanation of why (1) is odd
is no explanation at all. In other words, why is it a problem that
John's "knowledge" is not "real-world", but it's not a problem that his
convinction is not "real-world"? Maybe it's because knowlwdge carries
with it a presupposition of truth and conviction does not? I'm not
saying that that's the only possible explanation, but you have not
yet offered an alternative.

> But if the two versions of knowledge are
>equally likely to be real-world, we do not find the use of "know" so odd:
>
>John knows that Pete has 2 kids, but Jim knows that Pete has 3 kids.  Which
>is really true, I can't say.

I find that sentence very odd. If it were normal then "know" would not
have presupposition of truth, I agree with that, but it isn't normal as
far as I can tell.

 >>(a) do rirni re da i ku'i la djan djuno le du'u do ca'a rirni pa da
>
>That works even more easily because you left the first sentence tenseless
>and the second rirni clause is not. But in any case, you left out the x4s
>that lead to perfect sense:
>
>(a) do rirni re da fo lenu do morji

(What's the x4 of rirni?)

>.i ku'i la djan djuno ledu'u
>do ca'a rirni pada fo leni vitke ledo lanzu zdani kei ku'i lenu la djan
>na djuno ledu'u do kansa be ledo pamoi speni bei rirni le drata

You're changing the context on me so as to make the subclause true!
You're just proving my point, you need understand the subclause
as true in order for the sentence to make sense.

>In English we do not have these implied extra places, but instead have the
>stated or elided assumption of a single absolute reality.  In Lojban there
>is no absolute reality and we have the elided expression of a variety of
>x4 epistemologies that allow different truths to coexist or to collide.

I can't make any sense of that. Neither in English nor in Lojban need
one make any assumptions of absolute reality. As for the x4, I thought
we had agreed that it was for how x1 acquired knowledge x2, and it had
nothing to do with the truth of x2.

co'o mi'e xorxes