Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

Lojbab:
> >> >> (there
> >> >> being no place for the speaker in the (default - non BAId) place
 structur
> >> >
> >> >Agreed. The same goes for all the gismu. Noone has proposed that
> >> >{djuno} needs a place for the speaker. In fact, even if the speaker
> >> >were a participant in the gismu meaning it would be pointless to
> >> >have a sumti place for the speaker, because the speaker is
> >> >identifiable from the context.
> >>
> >> Not always.
> >
> >Well if you seriously consider that a problem, it would be soluble by
> >whatever means would be used to identify the referent/denotation of
> >{mi}.
>
> only if "mi" is used in the bridi.

There's always {mi`e}.

> In "la djan. djuno X" there is no need to resolve "mi", nor to know who
> the speaker is, to understand the claim.  Therefore the truth-belief of
> the speaker should be irrelevant to the truth of "la djan djuno X".

I agree. I have been saying this all along. Indeed, it's exactly what
I say in the quoted stuff you were replying to.

It is only you who somehow thinks that the true-x2 version of djuno
somehow peculiarily requires a place for the speaker.

> >> In any event, I do not thonk that the truth of a djuno
> >> proposition should depend on the speaker.
> >
> >By "djuno proposition" do you mean the x2, or the proposition
> >containing "djuno"?
>
> The latter
>
> >If the latter:
> >The truth of a djuno proposition depends on the speaker in exactly
> >the same way that any other proposition depends on the speaker. -
>
> ta mlatu
>
> or maybe better
>
> ko'a mlatu (assuming that ko'a has been prespecified)
>
> has a truth value independent of the speaker.  Or if it does not, then there
> should be a BAI or context that explicitly places the speaker into the
> bridi.  In the absence of any such mention, I would not feel a need to
> know who the speaker was to evaluate the truth of the claim.  I want the
> same to be true of djuno.

I absolutely utterly utterly 100% agree. So does Jorge. So we are all
in complete unanimity on this.

So what we disagree on is on whether

    ko`a jetyju`o ko`e   [where jetyju`o = true-x2 version of djuno]

has a truth-value that is as independent of the speaker as {ta
mlatu}.

> >> It is at least as jsutifiable that
> >> the truth of adjuno proposition should depend on the listener/reader.
> >
> >(a) Explain what you mean. (b) Prove it is as justifiable.
>
> It is justifiable in that we have prescribed that Lojban pragmatics are
 weighted to require that a speaker be clear according to the terms of the
 listener.
> I would interpret this among other things as requiring thatone abide by the
> definitions and judgements of ones audience in the event of possible
 confusion.
>
> But that is not what I "meant".  I was trying to say that a listener, not
> knowing who the speaker was (say he sees this djuno statement written as
> graffiti on a wall) will interpret the statement based on HIS interpretation
> of djuno and the truth of x2.  IN certain media, statements can be separated
> from their original speakers, and the only possible standard of jusgement
> is that of the reader/listener.

OK. But since I remain unpersuaded that the speaker is any more
implicated in a djuno proposition than in any other proposition, I
conclude that what you say is, though reasonable, irrelevant.

> But I also realize that in such media, the speaker cannot know who his readers
> will be, and it makes a lot better sense for the standard of djuno to be
> le djuno.

What "standard of djuno" do you mean?

> >> They may be observer based
> >> in which case epistemology is the x2 and jetnu becomes akin to djuno.
> >
> >Who would the observer be?
>
> Well to take the obvious example, certain statements involving relativity
> theory give different truths depending on the observer.

OK. So if there are multiple realities each accessible only by a
different observer, and the observer actually cognizes the reality,
then what you'd need is

   x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3 by observer-dependent metaphysics x5 with
      epistemology x4

You might then define {djuno} as:

   x1 cognizes that x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent
      metaphysics, with epistemology x4

Now my question would be this: if x1 is in error - if x1 thinks that
x2 is true of x3, by a possibly x1-dependent metaphysics, with
epistemology x4, but x1 is in fact mistaken and x2 is, by the
metaphysics, not true, *would this count as djuno*?

If you say No, then I think we are converging on agreement. If you
say Yes, then we're not.

Oh shit. Maybe there's no hope of convergence after all. I have just
reread what you said, and your example is supposed to be one of
different *epistemologies*, not metaphysicses, which is how I took it.
I'm still not clear on what {jetnu} means with an epistemology x2.

> >> They may be based on some fuzzy definition, in which case some minimum
 level
> >f fuzzy truth may
> >> be required to call a statement jetnu, and that standard would then go in
 x2
> >
> >This is too vague for me to understand it.
>
> Using what I understand as Belknap's version of  fuzzy truth, the truth
> value of "George is bald" might be some thing other than binary 0 or 1.
> If  the truth value is .9 on a  scale of 0/1, si it "true" for purposes of
> evaluating "djuno"?  How about .8? etc.  If  things are based on le djuno's
> perception of truth, whatever that may be, then I don't necessarily need to
> know about fuzzy truth considerations.  If I have to deal with 5 different
> speakers making contradictory claims about whether le djuno cu djuno, and
> each speaker uses a different criterion (fuzzy level) to decide whether
> le se djuno is true, then I cannot interpret the statements without going into
> the fuzzy conceptions of each of those 5 speakers.

I understand your example. There remain two things I don't
understand.

1. Why are three distinct notions conflated into the x2 of jetnu?
They should have been separated out. As it stands, if "ko`a jetnu
ko`e", you don't know whether ko`e is a metaphysics, a standard, or
an epistemology. Okay, that works, but it seems a bit weird to have a
common or garden *gismu*, rather than an abstruse philosopher's
jargon lujvo, meaning "x2 is either a metaphysics, a standard or an
epistemology for the truth of x1"!

2. Why does {jetnu} have a standard-or-metaphysics place and {mlatu}
not? It seems to me (at least at the moment, but mi jinvi gi`e na
birti) that {mlatu} has an equally good claim to such a place.

--And.