Re: Summary so far on DJUNO

[And Rosta <a.rosta@UCLAN.AC.UK>]

I should point out that the topic of the thread appears to have moved
on from the question of what {djuno} SHOULD mean, to the question of
whether the true-x2 definition of {djuno} is inherently flawed.

Lojbab:
> >> >2. Why does {jetnu} have a standard-or-metaphysics place and {mlatu}
> >> >not? It seems to me (at least at the moment, but mi jinvi gi`e na
> >> >birti) that {mlatu} has an equally good claim to such a place.
> >...
> >
> >But how about an answer to my question, which has also independently
> >been posed by Jorge a number of times?
>
> Because truth and metaphysics are definitionally recognized to be intertwined.
> Because "what is truth?" seems to be the ultimate metaphysical question.
> "What is a cat?" is not.
>
> We categorize the things in the world such that some of them are cats.
> Metaphysics doesn't determine which properties are associated with cathood;
> that set of properties is part of the definition of "cat".
>
> The same would apply to truth except that  the very existence of multiple
> metaphysics means that we do not necessarily agree what properties apply, as
> those properties are in fact associated with different metaphysics'.

"True" is dead easy to define. Proposition P is true for world W iff
the state-of-affairs 'decribed' by P exists in W.

So to know whether "P is true" is true, you have expand the statement
to "P is true in world W". Likewise, to know whether "X is a cat (of
species Y)" is true, you have to expand the statement to "X is a cat
(of species Y) in world W".

You have not persuaded me of any crucial difference between True and
Cat.

Anyway, it seems to me as if you are getting distracted by some
peculiar obsession about the word "true". When I use "true" in
speaking of the true-x2 version of {djuno}, I use it in the same
sense as is involved in the definition of cmavo like:

   ja`a, na, ge, ga, go, gu, jei

For example,

      ko`a djuno le du`u ko`e mlatu

would be truth-conditionally equivalent to

      ge ko`e mlatu gi ko`a djuno le du`u ko`e mlatu

> >I am arguing that if {djuno} is to be usefully distinct from other
> >{gismu}, then, in the current absence of alternative distinctions [an
> >absence which I hope to rectify in a later message], a useful
> >distinction is for x2 of {djuno} to be true.
>
> It has to be true for the x1.  There are things that I beleive/krici, but
 which
> I also have some degree of doubt.  There are things that I opine, but I also
>  harbor some doubt.  But given a particular epistemology, I should not have
>  doubt
> regarding something i djuno.  On the other hand, djuno is distinguished from
>  birti in that I can be birti of something without being able to justify it,
> or epistemologize it.  I can also djuno something without being birti of it,
> if I have one epistemology which without doubt "proves" the x2, whereas
 another
> epistemology supports doubt.

This wasn't what I was intending to suggest, but it makes
distinctions:

krici  -evidence
djuno  +justification -doubt
jinvi  +justification
birti  -doubt

- that's based on what you say above.

FWIW, what I was intending to suggest was:

jinvi  +justification +high degree of doubt/low degree of certainty
birti                 +low degree of doubt/high degree of certainty
djuno  +justification

> >I am NOT arguing that {djuno} MUST be defined in such a way that its
> >x2 is true. Just that, other things being equal, {djuno} SHOULD be so
> >defined.
>
> No - I am saying that my concept of truth recognizes that there are many
> flavors of truth, and I cannot see how to usefully apply "truth" as a
> standard to le se djuno without indicating what kind of truth one is
> referring to.

See below. If your concept of "truth" is like this, then I am not
talking about your concept of truth; x2 of djuno is "true" in a sense
different from what you purport to understand by the word.

> >You, though, seem to be arguing that the true-x2 version of {djuno}
> >is somehow inherently flawed, and I strongly contest that. If you did
> >turn out to be correct then your argument would pertain not to
> >{djuno} in particular but to the entire vocabulary.
>
> It is inherently flawed in that it talks about the truth of one place without
> bringing in the metaphysics associated with said truth.

Is {birti} then inherently flawed? "x1 is certain that x2 is true",
according to the gi`uste.

Anyway this complaint is unfair. The metaphysics by which ko`e in
{ko`a djuno ko`e} is true is the same metaphysics by which {ko`a
djuno ko`e} is true. In other words, "If X djuno Y then Y". If you
get worried about "truth" then use logical connectives instead.

> >At any rate, as I've said elsewhere, I don't see why x2's being true
> >requires a metaphysics place while x2's being, say, feline doesn't.
>
> because I don't know what you mean by claiming it is "true" unless you
> convey ytour metaphysics to me (I would usually assume some metaphysics
> similar to mine, probably incorrectly given the nature of our typical
> discussion %^).  The definition of what is true is a metaphysics.

I don't know what you understand by

1.     le du`u broda cu "true"

but what *I* mean by "true" is something that would make (1)
equivalent to (2).

2a.     ja`a broda
2b.     broda

And likewise

3.     le du`u broda cu "false"

is, in the sense in which I am using "false", equivalent to

4.     na broda

If you don't like using "true" and "false" in this way, please
nominate alternative terms and I will gladly reformulate the true-x2
definition of {djuno} so that it uses terms that you find less
perplexing.

> >So, to repeat, I deny that there is anything intrinsically
> >problematic with the true-x2 version of {djuno}.
>
> It is lacking the metaphysics place.

See my numerous remarks above and earlier for why this problem is a
figment of your imagination.

> It therefore makes as much sense to me as zi'o klama (without the x1).

The comparison is flawed. The meaning of {zi`o klama} is a kind of
klamaing where there isn't necessarily a goer. That is different from
what you (erroneously) claim true-x2 djuno to involve, namely a
predicate that involve an argument that is not expressible by a
syntactic sumti.

A better comparison would be with {viska}, which necessarily involves
the eyes or other visual organs, but has no syntactic sumti place for
the eyes.

As there is nothing wrong with {viska}, so there is nothing wrong
even with your erroneous version of true-x2 djuno.

> >{djuno} doesn't even specify the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2
> >to be true.
>
> Right, it need only be some metaphysics that is compatible with his
> epistemology (in his estimation).  No other person is mentioned in the bridi,
> so there is no basis to being in anyone else's judgement of teh unmentioned
> metaphysics.
>
> >Anyway, I would be content to define the true-x2 version of {djuno} as "...
> >and x2 is true by the metaphysics according to which x1 judges x2 to
> >be true". That would side-step the problem you raise.
>
> I think so, and indeed that it says what I just said.

Ok. Let us agree on this, then.

> But we don't know what
> that metaphysics is - it is not stated nor implied.  In any event the
> person who is judging truth is the x1, and not the speaker.  Thus George can
> djuno something by an epistemology whioch I reject as invalid, and thereby
> know something that I consider to be false.

By "know", do you mean "know", or do you mean "djuno"? I suspect you
mean "djuno".

Anyway, be that as it may...

I agree that George can djuno something by an epistemology that you
reject as invalid.
I agree that George can know something that you consider to be false.
I agree that George can djuno something that you consider to be false.

But where does this "thereby" come in? You seem to love to make
statements of the form "A and therefore B", where A and B make
perfect sense, but the "therefore" makes no sense at all.

> >> Going back to this, I think that djuno requires a metaphysics by which x1
> >> could conclude that x2 is true.
> >
> >Could *correctly* conclude that x2 is true?
>
> Correct by whose standards.  x1's standards are the only ones that count.
>
> I don't understand "correct" any more than I understand "true" in the
> absence of some universal standard of correctness and/or truthin this
> context.  And none has been stated.

You have in effect been saying that that {djuno} means

   epistemology x4 convinces x1 that x2 is true of x3 by a certain
       metaphysics, M

What I meant by "correct" - feel free to offer an alternative term
for this if you prefer it - is that

   x1 is "correct" [i.e. in djunoing] if x2 is indeed true of x3 by M

and

   x1 is "incorrect" if x2 is not true of x3 by M

The "true-x2" djuno meaning would be:

   x2 is true of x3 by a certain metaphysics, M, and epistemology x4
   convinces x1 that x2 is true of x3 by M

-- i.e. x1 must be "correct".

--And.