Re: Truth-ambiguous djuno [was Re: Summary so far on DJUNO]

["Jorge J. Llambías" <jorge@INTERMEDIA.COM.AR>]

la erik cusku di'e
> With truth being a much stickier subject than knowledge,
>removing any trace of it from "djuno" allows one to speak of knowledge
>without being bogged-down by truth.

In what sense is truth stickier than knowledge? It would seem
they are both bogging us down to the same extent.

 >Supposing that djuno could only be used if both the speaker and the x1
>believed x2 to be true.
>If they both believed in the truth of x2, then the speaker could use
>djuno.

Right.

>If the x1 believed but the speaker did not, this would indicate that
>they were not using the same epistemology.

Not necessarily. The speaker might consider that x1 is not using
the epistemology correctly. For example, let's say that John believes
that the derivative of f(x)=ln(x) is g(x)=xln(x)-x by the epistemology of
mathematics. Now, if the speaker knows that g(x) is not the derivative
of f(x), that does not indicate that they are not using the same
epistemology, it only indicates that the speaker knows that John
is mistaken in his belief.

>Perhaps the x1 was using an
>epistemology the speaker considered to be flawed, i.e., not producing
>true statements, for the particular subject, and the speaker could not
>use djuno.

That's a possibility, but it's not necessary.

>Having recognized that the x1 is using an epistemology which x1 believes
>to be producing true results, but which is actually in error, the
>speaker must then doubt their own epistemology by which they judged the
>x2 to be false.

Why? Everybody can doubt their epistemologies, of course, but what
you say doesn't follow at all.

>It is directly observed that not all epistemologies
>which are believed to be producing true results by their users actually
>do produce true results.

Right. That does not mean that no epistemology is valid.

>The speaker now can neither unreservedly agree nor disagree with the x1
>on the truthfulness of x2, unless to claim that their own personal
>epistemology is infallible on the subject.

Why? You don't have to believe your epistemology infallible in order
to believe that something is true.

>If the speaker cannot agree,
>then per the initial supposition, they cannot use djuno.

Right, but they may agree.

>Furthermore, the speaker can now not claim that anything they djuno is
>absolutely true either, having recognized the fallibility of
>epistemologies other than omniscience, and cannot use "mi djuno" either.

And yet speakers do use it all the time. Speakers say "such and such
is true" all the time too.

>Thus, supposing that both the speaker and the x1 agree to the truth of
>x2 results in no one ever being able to use djuno. :)

I'm not sure what you mean by the smiley. Obviously people have used
djuno agreeing with the x1 that the x2 is true.

>Removing the restriction that the speaker and the x1 agree to the truth
>of the x2 allows the speaker to use "mi djuno" without regard for the
>believed truth of x2, given the fallibility of epistemologies shown
>above.  :) :)

:) :) :)

>So, Doug can djuno statements about some subject by some epistemology,
>but no degree of truth or belief is ever implied at any point.  That's
>just how I was thinking of a truth-less djuno. :)  It even allows one to
>djuno things by some epistemology one is not decided on the truthfulness
>of.  Anyway, enough rambling.  Just something to think about. :)

I think that goes even beyond Lojbab's version. It would mean
something like "x1 entertains proposition x2 about x3 derived from
possible epistemology x4". Why keep the keyword "know" for such
a different concept?

co'o mi'e xorxes